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LOOKING TO THE FUTURE TO CORRECT
EVILS OF THE PAST-ATTEMPTS TO
MODERNIZE ILLINOIS FAMILY LAWt
Beverly A. Susler* and Eloise Johnstone**
The laws governing family relationshipsare the subject of criticism throughout the country as an area of the law especially in need of reform. The
authors analyze the many important statutory proposals now pending before the Illinois General Assembly, with particular emphasis on the comparative efficacy of these measures in correcting the shortcomings of existing divorce provisions.
VERY

field of law has its peculiar jargon, and the matrimonial

area is no exception. Practitioners in family law have heard
the following comments from clients and fellow lawyers all
too often.
"If I can't have a divorce, she won't get a dime of my money."
"How come I only got
----------- when my neighbor got
----------plus the car plus the house?"
"Sally's lawyer told her .... "
"He will support me for life even without a divorce."
"If I cry, will the judge give me more money?"
"It's the first of the month and John hasn't paid the child support yet."
"He can't have Johnny over the summer-that's when my mother comes."
"My wife called the police on me."
"I know it's 2 a.m. and I'm so sorry to bother you at home."
"How long...?"
"Is it all right for me to have a date for dinner now?"
"Do I have to get out of the house while the ball game is on?"
"I told you not to get into that area."
"You've got it easy-not like mergers, strikes-the daily business grind."
"I wouldn't handle that area if you paid me."
"Listen, I've got this problem-a friend of mine .

.

. and I thought

maybe you'd help me."
t
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"An easy problem-just a couple of minutes of your time-wife lives in
Topeka, husband in Albany, children with an aunt in St. Louis who
wants to raise them ....

Practicing attorneys holding themselves out as specialists in the field
of family law or frequent dabblers in the area recognize some, if not
all, of the above comments. Practitioners who avoid the area of family
law are urged to read further, for there is currently much controversy concerning the direction of Illinois laws governing marriage
and divorce. It behooves every lawyer to give more than a fleeting
moment of thought to the role the law plays, or ought to play, in
family relationships.
While at first glance the previous quotations may seem ludicrous,
they are not humorous. Although at times so disguised as to be
barely recognizable, 'they are in fact cries for help from persons
caught in an often unanticipated struggle for survival. Indeed, in
every matrimonial proceeding, whether divorce, separate maintenance, or annulment, the need of the human being to survive and his
capacity to fight against all odds is apparent. Where the investment and commitment have been as encompassing as society
demands of persons entering into marriage-at least theoretically
pledging themselves to each other for life-the loss, the sense of
failure and frustration upon breakdown of the marriage are devastating. In marriage breakdown the family, the foundation of society, is
collapsing; the ego is threatened; the spouses are angry and yet hurt.
They feel inadequate-having failed in the most basic, most emotional, albeit most difficult, of human relationships. Every lawyer
in the matrimonial field knows, however, that while feelings of guilt
are ever present, survival is the strongest of human motivations. The
result of all the conflicting human emotional responses in a matrimonial proceeding is open conflict. Present Illinois laws encourage
this fight in a variety of ways discussed later in this article.
Any matrimonial law which feeds the fire between discordant
spouses cries for reevaluation and reform. It would serve the
community well for every lawyer to make an inquiry as to the legitimate and desirable objectives of the matrimonial laws. Old cliches
that the state has an interest in marriage and the family, and
that the family is the foundation of our society, are over-used and
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eroded in significance. While society has an interest in preserving healthy marriages, society should also have an interest in salvaging as much as possible from unhealthy marriages. Much individual dignity and human talent can be saved, but is instead lost in the
fury of divorce.
To preserve what is healthy from an unhealthy marriage the law
should effect not punishment and reward, but an objective dissolution
of an unhealthy partnership. By twisting reality into an artificial set
of rules, legislators, judges, and lawyers have done a disservice in
the guise of strengthening society. Our task now, as lawmakers,
judges, and lawyers, is to evaluate the daily effectiveness of the law
and to update laws governing marriage, divorce, separate maintenance, annulment, and the myriad specific problems within each
area. Indeed, as more and more states enact reform, Illinois falls
further and further behind the trend toward realistic laws governing
family relationships.' Our law is not a guiding light but rather a follower and legitimizer, or at best a regulator, of a variety of human
practices-practices which are usually long established but only reluctantly acknowledged by the majority of society.
In Illinois the law governing marriage and divorce is so far removed
from reality that it is a sorrowful jest. Marriage, although solemnly entered into and recognized as the epitomy of all partnerships, under
Illinois law is none too solemnly, and almost always disastrously,
dissolved. But, it does not have to be. One partner in the
marriage need not "lose" in terms of ego, money, property, or parentchild relationship. The standards under present Illinois law establishing grounds for divorce, 2 child custody and support,8 division of
property,4 and alimony5 are archaic; and case law is stumbling along
with only occasional inroads into this restrictive, unrealistic legislation. While the current status of the law is discouraging, the prospects
for improvement are good. At present, in the field of family law,
progress in Illinois appears certain because primary emphasis
is on legislative reform as evidenced by the fourteen bills' now pend1. See note 33 and accompanying text, infra.
2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1 (1971).
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 19 (1971).
4.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, §§

17(a), 18 (1971).

5. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 19 (1971).
6. S. B. 254, 78th Ill. Gen. Assembly (1973)

(Introduced March 6, 1973)
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ing in the Illinois General Assembly.
MARRIAGE-THE ULTIMATE PARTNERSHIP

The most controversial issues concerning marriage legislation are
age and licensing requirements. 7 The controversy surrounding the
age of requirement is an emotional one. With the alarming increase
in the rate of divorce has come the plea to make it more difficult to marry. Consequently, advocates of increasing the legal age
for marriage to twenty-one argue that persons having reached this age
are better prepared to accept the responsibilities of marriage; that
marriages between younger persons are more susceptible to failure;
and that the institution of marriage cannot survive widespread acceptance of young marriages.
[hereinafter cited as S.B. 254].
S. B. 215, 78th Ill. Gen. Assembly (1973) (Introduced March 1, 1973) [hereinafter cited as H.B. 1794].
S. B. 106, 78th Ill. Gen. Assembly (1973) (Introduced Jan. 30, 1973) [hereinafter cited as S.B. 106].
S. B. 1169, 77th Ill. Gen. Assembly (1973) (Introduced April 20, 1971) [hereinafter cited as S.B. 1169].
S. B. 693, 77th IIl. Gen. Assembly (1973) (Introduced April 13, 1971) [hereinafter cited as S.B. 693].
H. B. 1794, 78th Ill. Gen. Assembly (1973) (Introduced April 27, 1973) [hereinafter cited as H.B. 1794].
H. B. 477, 78th Ill. Gen. Assembly (1973) (Introduced Feb. 28, 1973) [hereinafter cited as H.B. 477].
H. B. 465, 78th Ill. Gen. Assembly (1973) (Introduced Feb. 28, 1973 [hereinafter cited as H.B. 465].
H. B. 459, 78th Ill. Gen. Assembly (1973) (Introduced Feb. 28, 1973) [hereinafter cited as H.B. 459].
H.B. 403, 78th Ill. Gen. Assembly (1973) (Introduced Feb. 21, 1973) [hereinafter cited as H.B. 403].
H. B. 134, 78th Ill. Gen. Assembly (1973) (Introduced Jan. 30, 1973) [hereinafter cited as H.B. 134].
H. B. 3679, 77th Ill. Gen. Assembly (1973) (Introduced April 14, 1971) [hereinafter cited as H.B. 3679].
H. B. 629, 77th Ill. Gen. Assembly (1973) (Introduced Feb. 26, 1971) [hereinafter cited as H.B. 629].
H. B. 275, 77th 111. Gen. Assembly (1973) (Introduced Jan. 26, 1971) [hereinafter cited as H.B. 275].
7. Although advocates of contract marriages and marriages between persons of
the same sex are gaining increasing attention and consideration, none of the bills
pending before the Illinois legislature recognize such marriages. These concepts
may enter our laws at some future date but for the present they have been rejected
in favor of the solemnization long present in the law.
Section 206(b) of House Bill 1794 is unique among pending bills in that it
allows a marriage to be solemnized by proxy.
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On the other hand, proponents of age eighteen as the legal age of
marriage argue that one old enough to fight for his country, to vote,
and to enter into contracts is old enough to marry. Moreover, persons mature at different chronolgical ages and the arbitrary selection of an age will not solve the problem of the increasing divorce
rate.

Consistent with the present legal age of eighteen in Illinois,"
the two bills currently pending before the legislature which deal with
the age of marriage adopt eighteen as the legal age for marriage. 9
On the other hand, the proposed Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act, drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, permits persons eighteen years of age, or per8. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 131 (1971) provides:
Persons of the age of 18 shall be considered of legal age for all purposes,
except that of the Illinois Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, and until this age
is attained, they shall be considered minors.
In clarifying the effect of this Act on ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 89, § 3 (1971) (an act
to revise the law in relation to marriages: which provides that the consent of a
parent or guardian must be obtained by a male who has achieved the age of 18
years but has not yet attained the age of 21 years in contrast to a female who has
attained the age of 18 years being allowed to marry without parental consent), the
Honorable William J. Scott, Attorney General of the State of Illinois, in his comprehensive opinion letter, S-490 dated June 30, 1972 to Honorable Don Johnson,
State's Attorney of Perry County, concluded at page 8:
It is therefore my conclusion that under the federal Equal Protection
clause, the Illinois equal protection clause, Article I, see. 2, Article I,
sec. 18, of the Illinois Constitution providing equal protection to the
sexes, sec. 3 of "AN ACT to revise the law in relation to marriages" is
unconstitutional insofar as it differentiates between the sexes. The discrimination arises out of the provision that one sex need only be eighteen
years old to marry without consent and the other must wait until the age
of twenty-one to avail himself of this right. The placing of males and
females for marriage purposes in different classes, based solely on age
differential, does not rest upon any grounds of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced are treated alike. Therefore, the nondiscriminatory
age for both would be the lesser, and both male and female may marry
without parental consent at age eighteen.
The Attorney General relied upon the following authorities in reaching this
conclusion:

U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI,

§ 2; amend. XIV, §

1; ILL. CONST.

art. I, §§ 2, 18 Civil Rights Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1964); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1975(a)-(c), 2000(a)-(h-6) (1971); and cases under the Civil Rights Act finding
prohibition of sex discrimination: Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Lamb v.
Brown, 456 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1972); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1194
(7th Cir. 1971); Mixson v. Southern Tel. & Tel. Co., 334 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Ga.
1971); Doe v. Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 333 F. Supp. 1357 (D. Kan. 1971); Reed v.
Page, 40 U.S.L.W. 2631 (10th Cir. March 11, 1972).
9. H.B. 1794 § 203(2); H.B. 477 § 205.

1973]

FAMILY LAW

sons of the age of sixteen with either the consent of both parents or
guardian, or judicial approval, to marry. If under sixteen, consent
of both parents or guardian and judicial approval is required. The
proposed revisions to the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, permit persons between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one to marry
with the consent of parent, or guardian, or with judicial approval.Y
In effect, the legal age of marriage in the Revised Uniform Act is
twenty-one, but the drafters explain that in states where the age
of majority differs, the age for marriage should conform to major11
ity.
Exceptions to the legal age of marriage are treated differently in
House Bills 477 and 1794. In the former the only exception to the
requirement that persons seeking to marry be at least eighteen years
old is that one between the ages of sixteen and eighteen may marry
if the parent or guardian consents.' 2 Further, it deletes provisions
of the present Illinois law permitting marriages between persons
under the age of sixteen if the girl is pregnant or has given birth to a
child of the applicants.'
House Bill 1794 permits judicially approved marriages of sixteen
and seventeen year olds who have no parent capable of consenting
to the marriage, or whose parent or guardian has not consented to the
marriage, after a reasonable effort has been made to notify the parents
or guardians of the underaged party. A person under the age of
10. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 203(1) [hereinafter cited as UNIFORM ACT]; PROPOSED REVISED UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 203(1)
[hereinafter cited as REVISED UNIFORM ACT]. At the time of this writing the House

of Delegates of the American Bar Association has not considered the recommendations of the Family Law Section for the Revised Uniform Act which is not, therefore, an official ABA statement nor endorsed by the Uniform Commissioners on
State Laws.
11. "By a narrow margin the Special Committee voted to require parental
consent for persons under 21 for the reason that early marriage is a substantial
factor in the high divorce rate. Governor Ogilvie of Illinois in 1971 vetoed a bill
permitting persons under 21 to marry without parental consent, 'AN ACT to revise the law in relation to marriages,' ILL. REV. STAT. 1971, ch. 89, § 3, vetoed on
August 24, 1971) although he otherwise approved of majority at 18. Because some
feel there may be a constitutional question in states that have majority at 18, it was
decided to bracket '21' and age of 'majority;' if the latter is 18, then reference to
parental or judicial consent between 18 and 21 should be deleted." REVISED UNIFORM ACT § 203 (1), Comment.
12. H.B. 477, § 205.
13. ILL. REV.STATS. ch. 89, § 3.2(1) (1971).
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sixteen having the consent of both parents or his guardian may
marry. 14 However, a marriage license may be issued under these
circumstances only if the court finds that the underaged applicant is capable of assuming -the responsibilities of marriage and
that the marriage will serve his best interest; pregnancy alone does
not establish that the best interest of an applicant will be served.' 5
Further, a person between the age of sixteen and eighteen years
may marry with the consent of parent or guardian, or judicial approval.16
Another aspect of the age controversy is whether the legal age of
marriage must be the same for males and females. The argument
most often heard is that statutes specifying different ages are unconstitutional. 1 7 A rational basis, however, for differentiating between
males and females in this aspect was expressed by Judge Margaret
Mary J. Mangan of the New York Supreme Court in the recent case
of Friedrich v. Katz,' 8 where she noted that since traditionally the
male must support his wife and children, his readiness for marriage requires additional years of training and experience. What
effect, if any, this will have on pending Illinois legislation remains to
be seen.
Pending legislation reflects the increased social and medical
awareness of the numerous diseases affecting not only applicants
for a license to marry, but possibly their unborn children. House
Bill 1794 adds to the existing premarital testing requirement for
venereal diseases the testing for immunity to Rubella, 9 although this
has been ruled unconstitutional and the statutory provision to this effect has been repealed,2 0 and testing for sickle cell anemia." When
14. H.B. 1794, §§ 205(a)(l)-(2).
15. H.B. 1794 § 205(b).
16. H.B. 1794 § 203(1).
17. See note 8, supra.
18. 341 N.Y.S.2d 932 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
19. H.B. 1794, § 203(3)(b)(1).
20. Illinois Counsel of the Community Action Program v. Yoder, No. 72 CH
5627 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty., Ill.). This case involved a class action suit brought on
behalf of all women of the State of Illinois against the Director of the Illinois Department of Public Health and all clerks for the issuance of marriage licenses. The
court ruled as unconstitutional Public Act 77-2294, approved by the Governor,
August 10, 1972, effective October 1, 1972, which provided:
No marriage license shall be issued unless there is filed by the county clerk
an affidavit signed by a duly licensed physician stating that he has admin-
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one considers such other possibilities as, for example, Tay Sachs,
congenital heart or kidney malfunctions, proclivity toward tuberculosis, cancer, diabetes, and countless additional danger signs discovered through advancing medical technology, it is obvious that
these two additional tests are restrictive in their scope of endeavor.
Moreover, specific limitations raise problems of class or special legislation.
House Bill 477, on the other hand, in addition to requiring
tests for venereal diseases, confronts this problem by requiring
that license applicants be advised of abnormalities which may cause
birth defects.2 2 Contrary to positive findings of venereal disease
which prevent issuance of a marriage license, such advice is for the
information of affected persons and cannot bar issuance of a license.28
Variations of diseases are so great that at this time it is impossible
with the limited public facilities, finances, and personnel available
to establish uniform testing requirements and facilities. This generalization, however, is a step in the right direction to aid the applicants involved, and is a stimulus to the medical profession and the
Department of Public Health to perfect procedures in the foreseeable
future to make testing facilities readily available to all persons throughout the state.
ANNULMENT-AN

ENIGMA

Annulment, heretofore a creature whose makeup in Illinois has
been determined entirely by case law, offers a unique opportunity
for reform in that it may be included as an integral part of the statutory law governing family relationships. As a result of such reform
this nebulous creature would be more easily found and understood
by persons affected, and practically applied by the legal profession.
istered to the woman a test of immunity to Rubella, known as German
measles.
An appeal of this decision has been rendered moot as a result of the amendment to
the Marriage Act which repeals the requirement that an affidavit of the woman's
immunity to Rubella be filed before issuance of a marriage license. ILL. REv. STAr.
ch. 89, § 6(c) (effective October 1, 1973).
21.

H.B. 1794, § 203(3) is identical to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 89, § 6(b) (Supp.

1972) which has not been subjected to a constitutional challenge to date.
22. H.B. 477, § 206(d).
23.

See H.B. 477, H§ 206(d)-(e).
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In attempting to codify laws relating to annulment and then to
correlate those laws with others governing children of broken marriages, property, and support, one is forced to choose between two
philosophies as to what annulment is and what its effects are or ought
to be. One line of thinking advocates annulment as an alternative to
divorce and allows persons who, for whatever reason, prefer annulment to divorce, to seek annulment, provided appropriate grounds
are available. Consistent with this philosophy, property, support,
and children are treated as in cases of divorce. The other viewpoint perpetuates the essential difference between annulment and divorce. Annulment, or a declaration of invalidity as it is often
called, terminates a purported family relationship which is not recognized as a marriage under the law.
Obviously, even a purported marriage may create problems of
property, support, and children. These issues must and can be
determined without confusing the concepts of annulment and divorce. Spousal support, property rights and obligations grow out
of a legal marriage. Where a purported marriage is either prohibited by law or is not recognized by the law, no such rights and obligations can accrue. It is nonetheless necessary to solve these practical problems resulting from annulment, but without fictionalizing
the rationale of the results.
Present attempts to revise and codify laws governing annulment
adopt similar grounds for annulment and affirmative defenses to
the action and generally abandon the confusing characterizations of
void and voidable marriages, or those void ab initio and those which
can be avoided. Proposals differ with respect to permitting annulment actions after the death of a party to a purported marriage and
with respect to time limits within which annulment actions may be
brought.24
24. UNIFORM ACT § 208(a)(1)-(4); (b)(1)-(3); REVISED UNIFORM ACT 99
208(a)(l)-(4), (b)(1)-(3), and (c); H.B. 1794 §§ 208(a)(1)-(4), (b)(1)-(3), and
(c); H.B. 403 § 4(a)-(e); and H.B. 477 99 303, and 308.
Section 208(c) of the Revised Uniform Act fails to explain how section 207(b),
referred to therein, declaring a prohibited marriage valid after removal of the im-

pediment, can apply to impediments listed in sections 207(a)(2) and (3), namely
marriages between ancestors and descendants, uncles and nieces, and the like.
The only impediment resulting in a prohibited marriage which could be removed is
cited in section 207(a)(1), a bigamous marriage. Section 208 of the Revised Uniform Act allows ratification in the cases of parties lacking capacity to consent and
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Of all legislation pending in Illinois, House Bill 477 sets forth

most clearly those relationships which fall within the grounds for
annulment and declares such relationships invalid. 25

Problems of

child support and legitimacy, property division, and spousal support
resulting from an invalid marriage are treated separately, but consistently with the premise that a legal marriage never existed.2
The division of property is governed as in cases of divorce with
property being segregated first into individually owned property and
the balance then divided between the parties, using guidelines of acquisition and contribution to the value of that property made by the
individual.27 Permanent alimony is denied either of the parties

except in the case of a bigamous marriage 28 and temporary alimony
under-age marriage. House Bill 477 adopts the ratification principles expounded in
the Revised Uniform Act and adds the case of impotency to those which may be
ratified (section 308(b) ), and no time limitation on annulment actions are included. House Bill 1794 adopts the provisions of the Uniform Act, including Alternative B which, in part, allows a Declaration of Invalidity for prohibited marriages to be brought at any time not later than five years following the death of
either party (section 208 Uniform Act). See Podell, The Case for Revision of
the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 8 FAMILY L.Q. 169 (1973). Judge Podell
is Chairman of the Family Law Section of the American Bar Association.
25. House Bill, § 303 provides:
The following marriages are invalid:
(a) Marriages entered into in violation of Section 204 of this Act
[marriages between certain related individuals];
(b) Marriages entered into prior to a dissolution of an earlier marriage
of one of the parties;
(c) Common law marriages originating in Illinois after June 30, 1905;
(d) Marriages wherein one party lacked the mental capacity to consent to the marriage because of mental infirmity or the influence of alcohol,
drugs, or other incapacitating substances;
(e) Marriages wherein one party failed to voluntarily consent thereto
because of fraud, duress, or undue influences;
(f) Marriages wherein either party at the time of the marriage was
and continues to be impotent, and the other party at the time of the
marriage did not know of such impotence;
(g) Marriages entered into in violation of Section 205 of this Act.
House Bill 477, § 205 provides: "All persons of the age of 18 years and upwards, may contract and be joined in marriage. A person 16 years of age and upwards may contract a legal marriage if the parent or guardian of such person appears before the county clerk in the county where such minor person resides, or
before the county clerk to whom application for a license under Section 206 is
made, and makes affidavit that he or she is the parent or guardian of such minor
and gives consent to the marriage ....
26. H.B. 477, §§ 310 (spousal support), 311 (child support), 312 (spousal support), and 313 (property).
27. H.B. 477, § 313.
28. H.B. 477, § 312.
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is prohibited to the moving party.29 Obviously, the moving party in
annulment ought not be permitted, on one hand, to declare that
there is an invalid, or non-existent marriage, and on the other hand,
to be entitled to that relief which arises only from a valid marriage.
In the case of a bigamous marriage, a party may file an action for
divorce if he wishes temporary relief. If he wants an annulment,
he must forego temporary support.
All pending legislation with the exception of House Bill 403,
which is silent on the subject, is uniformly consistent in dealing
with children born to parties involved in annulment actions by de30
claring their legitimacy.
Ambiguous as the law of annulment has been in Illinois, present
legislative efforts strongly suggest that progress will be made in codifying and clarifying the law in this area.
"IF I CAN'T HAVE A DIVORCE, SHE WON'T GET
A
DIME OF MY MONEY"

This attitude prevalent in the application of present Illinois law

is guaranteed to accomplish nothing for litigants but heartache,
frustration and unnecessary expense. So too, the attempts of
one spouse to paint himself as a noble preserver of the marriage while

totally discrediting his spouse are unproductive at best and disastrous
at worst. As an alternative, the national trend in laws governing
divorce is a shift to "no-fault divorce." This catchy, headline-fitting
phrase deserves further analysis.
"No-fault" means regardless of fault. Fault is not to be considered-it is irrelevant. Instead of concentrating on the conduct or
misconduct of the parties, the viability of the marriage will be examined. If the marriage is dead, it will be legally terminated. The
difference between no-fault and fault is that no-fault focuses on the
condition of the marriage while fault concentrates on the conduct of
the parties.

There are three different types of no-fault provisions categorized
House Bill 1794, § 208(1) limits fraud which causes incapacity for consent to
"fraud involving the essentials of marriage."
29. H.B. 477, § 310.
30. UNIFoRM ACT § 208-Alternative B(d); H.B. 1794 § 208(3)(d); H.B. 477
§§ 309(b)-(c). REVISED UNIFoRM ACT § 208(d).
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according to their language: (1) those using the modem language
of "irretrievable breakdown" or "irreconcilable differences"-often

in combination, such as, "irreconcilable differences which have
caused the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage"; (2) separation

provisions which grant divorce after voluntary separation or after living apart under a separate maintenance decree for a period of time;
and (3)

those using the language of incompatibility.81

In addi-

tion, Texas has a unique ground for divorce, insupportability, which
is in reality a no-fault provision.82 Considering the variety of nofault provisions, one finds only eleven states which can truly be
called fault states-that is, they have no ground for divorce which
31. Forty states, including the District of Columbia have enacted some type of
no-fault provision in their divorce statutes. Seventeen use the modern language of
"irretrievable breakdown" or "irreconcilable differences."
Seventeen have separation provisions ranging in time from Rhode Island (10 years) to Vermont
which has six months coupled with the requirement that "resumption of marital relations is not reasonably probable." Seven states have incompatibility statutes.
Two of the seven, Delaware and Nevada, also have separation provisions. Texas
is unique. See note 32, infra. The following chart illustrates the states in each
category:
Irretrievable BreakdownIrreconcilable differences
Alabama
Arizona
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Florida
Hawaii
Idaho
Indiana
Iowa
Kentucky
Michigan
Nebraska
New Hampshire
North Dakota
Oregon
Washington

Separationn
Arkansas
Delaware
District of
Columbia
Louisiana
Maryland
Minnesota
Nevada
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Tennessee
Vermont
Virginia
West Virginia
Wisconsin

(3 years)
(18 months)
(1 year)
(2 years)
(18 months)
(2 years)
(1 year)
(18 months)
(1 year)
(1 year)
(10 years)
(3 years)
(2 years)
(6 months)
(2 years)
(2 years)
(5 years)

Incompatibility
Alaska
Kansas
Nevada
New Mexico
Oklahoma
Utah
Delaware

32. TEXAs FAMILY CODE ANN. § 3.01 (1971) provides:
On the petition of either party to a marriage, a divorce may be decreed
without regard to fault if the marriage has become insupportable because of
discord or conflict of personalities that destroys the legitimate ends of the
marriage relationship and prevents any reasonable expectation of reconciliation.
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can even remotely be called a no-fault ground. Sadly, Illinois is one
of the eleven. 3
No-fault is not a new concept. The language of "irretrievable
breakdown" or "irreconcilable differences" is relatively new in the
United States. 4 Of the seventeen states using this language, the
earliest to change were California and Iowa in 1970. Most
changes occurred in 1971 and 1972 with the latest being Connecticut (act effective October 1, 1973), Indiana (amendment effective
September 1, 1973), and Arizona (act effective August 8, 1973).11
The concept, however, of granting a divorce to both parties regardless of their mutual fault, or of not determining which spouse is at
36
fault, is not a new idea.

The various no-fault provisions are incorporated into statutes as
either the sole ground for divorce, "pure no-fault statute," or in ad33. Including Illinois, the eleven fault states are Georgia, Maine, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Wyoming.
Pennsylvania is presently considering no-fault legislation. See Morrissey, Significant Developments in Divorce Legislation, 44 Pa. B. Ass'n Q., 567 (1973).
34. Other countries, such as New Zealand, have long recognized breakdown
of marriage as a legitimate ground for divorce. See NEW ZEALAND DOMESTIC PROCEEDINGS AcT (1968).
35. Connecticut recently passed Pub. Act 73-373, effective October 1, 1973.
For background of this legislation see Cohen, Divorce Reform-Another Point of
View, 47 CONN. B.J. 88 (1973); Finding Fault With No-Fault Divorce: The
Proposed Connecticut Divorce Statute, 47 CONNECTICUT BAR J. 99 (1973).
36. Alaska, for example, as far back as 1935, before it was ever a state, had
incompatibility as a ground for divorce. Further, no-fault has poked its head
through the back door in some states ilke Kansas which through case law in 1918
made recrimination discretionary, recognizing in effect that divorce can be granted
regardless of mutual fault. So too, the recent Illinois case of Mogged v. Mogged,
5 Ill. App. 3rd 581, 284 N.E.2d 663 (1972), in abolishing recrimination as a defense, although not quite advocating irretrievable breakdown as a sole or additional
ground, stated:
It should be expressly noted that what we have stated here should not be
deemed to constitute a judicial adoption of an additional ground for divorce
in this State, e.g. irreconcilable differences, which of course would be
wholly improper as an encroachment upon the legislative domain. What
we do say, however, is that courts no longer need slavishly or automatically
apply the historic doctrine of recrimination in cases where such application
would, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, be unwarranted.
id. at 589, 284 N.E.2d at 667.
During the last week of October 1973 the Illinois Supreme Court in a split decision reversed and remanded Mogged holding that the abolishment or modification
of the defense of recrimination was a question to be solved by legislative change
not by the courts. The doctrine of recrimination, therefore, remains present Illinois
law. 55 111.2d 221, 302 N.E.2d 293 (1973).
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dition to traditional fault grounds, "modified no-fault statute." Of
the seventeen states using the modern language of "irretrievable
breakdown" or "irreconcilable differences," five states-Alabama,
Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, and North Dakota-add the no-fault
provision to traditional fault grounds. States having voluntary
separation or incompatibility grounds include these grounds in conjunction with traditional fault grounds. Thus, twenty-seven states,
including the District of Columbia, have modified no-fault statutes
as defined.
One must be wary of labels because there is disagreement in distinguishing a pure no-fault statute from a modified no-fault statute
and fault may enter into the definition or proof of a no-fault ground.
Some argue that modified no-fault statutes are not simply defined as
those adding a no-fault provision to traditional fault grounds for divorce, but also include those statutes containing a no-fault provision as the sole ground with the qualification of a waiting period
and/or mandatory counseling as a condition precedent to the entry
of a decree for divorce based on no-fault. Moreover, fault too often
is interjected in defining or proving a no-fault ground, as in the
California, Oregon, and New Hampshire statutes. 7 Such statutes
not only would allow fault to enter 'into the proceeding, but also
would permit the party at fault to raise his own marital misconduct
to realize a divorce.
The Revised Uniform Act, for example, adopts irretrievable breakdown of the marriage as the sole ground for divorce. However,
section 302(2) requires that this must be established by proof
(a)

that the parties have lived separate and apart for a period of more

than one year next preceding the commencement of this proceeding, or,
(b) that such serious marital misconduct has occurred which has so adversely affected the physical or mental health of the petitioning party as
to make it impossible for the parties to continue the marital relation, and
that reconciliation is improbable ....

An amendment has been made to change the above language to
read:
(2) the court finds that the marriage is irretrievably broken, if the
finding is supported by evidence that (i) the parties have lived separate
and apart for a period of more than 180 days next preceding the commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) there is serious marital discord ad37.

Cal. Civ. Code § 4506 (West 1970); Ore. Rev. Stat. ch. 107, § 107.025

(1971); and N.H. Rev. Stat. ch. 458, § 7(a) (1971).
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versely affecting the attitude of one or both of the parties toward the
marriage. . . .s

Regardless of the label, if the statute looks only at the viability
of the marriage and completely excludes the conduct of the parties in determining whether to terminate the marriage, it is a pure nofault statute. Therefore, if a statute were to contain, with respect to
grounds for divorce, only a provision using the modem language of
"irreconcilable differences" or "irretrievable breakdown," incompatibility, or voluntary separation for a period of time without fault
entering into either the definition or proof required for terminating
the marriage, the statute would qualify as a pure no-fault statute.
The authors do not believe that either the requirement of a waiting
period or mandatory counseling prior to the entry of a decree for divorce based on no-fault in any way changes the basic concept of nofault, as such requirements go to the condition of the marriage. On
the other hand, if the provision of the statute allows fault to enter
into the picture either as an alternative to a no-fault ground or in defining or proving a no-fault ground, it is a modified no-fault statute.
It is helpful to consider the national trends in no-fault divorce in
order to understand and evaluate thd proposals in Illinois. All
pending Illinois legislation seemingly adopt no-fault with respect to
grounds for divorce but differ in the degree and method used. Only
two out of six proposed bills adopt no-fault as a sole ground for divorce. Section 302(a)(3) of House Bill 1794 adopts pure no-fault
as the sole ground in the following language: "the court finds that
the marriage is irretrievably broken . . . ." Senate Bill 693 also
specifies, as the sole ground for divorce, irreconcilable differences,
and defines this term as "[tihose things determined by the court as
substantial reasons for not continuing the marriage and which make
it appear that the marriage should be dissolved." 3
The other four bills pending in the Illinois Legislature treating
this subject are modified no-fault bills with respect to grounds, in
that they retain traditional fault grounds but add a no-fault provision as an alternative. To the already existing eleven grounds for
divorce, House Bill 465 adds two additional grounds: (1) permanent mental illness; and (2) living separate and apart for two
38.

REVISED UNIFORM ACT § 302(2)(3), amendments dated August 14, 1973.

39. S.B. 693, § 1.
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years provided there remain irreconcilable differences after submis-

sion to reconciliation services approved by the court. 40 House Bill

403 contains an additional ground, which is a fault ground. It
reads: "Living separate and apart . . . without fault"4' "for two
years after process is sought and parties have submitted to reconcili'42
ation service.
House Bill 629 adds to existing grounds: "(1) Regardless of

fault irreconcilable differences causing irretrievable breakdown of
marriage, and (2) Incurable insanity."'" In addition, House Bill 629
defines irreconcilable differences in the same manner as Senate Bill

693." 4 Further, House Bill 629 prohibits raising misconduct except
when child custody is at issue and where it is necessary to establish

irreconcilable differences. Not only does House Bill 629 revert to
fault in guise of no-fault, it also allows marital misconduct to enter into

child custody. While this is not without precedent,45 it is the worst
possible place in a divorce proceeding to allow the introduction of
fault. A child deserves the untainted love and attention of both
parents. Confusing issues of custody and visitation with issues relevant only to the viability of the marriage afflicts unnecessary harm
and additional burdens on the child.4 6 The law should preserve par-

ental respect for the sake of the child.
House Bill 477 adds to the existing grounds the following:
(b) A divorce shall be granted when either spouse has proved that the
parties have lived separate and apart for a continuous period in excess of
40. H.B. 465, § 1.
41. H.B. 403, § 5(a) (emphasis added).
42. H.B. 403 § 6(k). As well as pertaining to fault, sections 5 and 6 of House
Bill 403 appear to present some procedural problems. Parties must live separate and
apart for two years after process is sought. On what grounds can parties file an
initial complaint? Obviously, the traditional fault grounds.
43. H.B. 629, § 1(b).
44. See text accompanying note 37, supra.
45. Among the states which permit fault in relation to custody are California,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Oregon. Despite this precedent, however, as with
the invasion of fault in determining the marriage status, see text accompanying note
37, supra, such a statutory loophole permitting the worst aspects of a divorce situation to directly affect children, often innocent, long-suffering victims of a matrimonial fiasco, is less than desirable.
46. See address by Ner Littner, M.D., Director of the Child Therapy Training
Program, Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis, entitled "Effects on a Child of Family
Disruption and Separation From One or Both Parents," Eleventh Annual Conference
of Conciliation Courts, Chicago, Illinois, May 19, 1973.
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2 years and irreconcilable differences have caused the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage.
(1) The requirement herein of living separate and apart for a continuous period in excess of 2 years may be waived upon written stipulation
of both spouses.
(2) Such stipulation shall be filed with the clerk of the court not
47
sooner than 30 days after commencement of the action for divorce.

This waiver provision permits divorce by consent. Where parties
stipulate in writing to waive the two year separation requirement,
they are allowed a divorce after thirty days upon representation of
irreconcilable differences.
Illinois presently does not have free state-wide conciliation services available. Mandatory conciliation requirements written into a
statute are unworkable without funds available to provide the facilities necessary to meet such requirements. Furthermore, counseling
forced upon persons determined to end their marriage is suspect as a
waste of time, money, and energies. Preferable to mandatory counseling is a time period statutorily required to establish proof of
cause for divorce which at the same time allows parties to reconsider and to seek counseling if they desire. This is not to say that a
court should not inquire as to reconciliation attempts, especially
where no-fault is the basis of divorce. Indeed, the court should inquire, and efforts should be made to establish uniformly effective
marriage counseling throughout the state.
No-fault is in part designed to reduce the animosity between unhappy spouses. Divorce is here to stay, but all that can be done to
reduce its disastrous effects ought to be done. In keeping with the
no-fault concept is the awarding of a divorce to both parties. Thus,
one party is not the winner and the other the loser, but the dead marriage is legally terminated. House Bills 403 and 477, and Senate Bill
1169 all affirmatively grant decrees to both parties.4"
Further, in keeping with the no-fault concept is an innovation
in House Bill 477 of bifurcated trials. A marriage can be dissolved
-a divorce decreed-prior to determination of property, support,
and custody issues. 49 This decreases opportunity for blackmail.
Still, safeguards are present in that the court can continue its in47. H.B. 477, §§ 403(b)(1)-(2).
48. S.B. 1169, § 10; H.B. 477, § 410(d)(1); H.B. 403, § 8.
49. H.B. 477, § 410(c).
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junctive and temporary relief pertaining to yet undetermined issues.

50

"HE WILL SUPPORT ME FOR LIFE EVEN
WITHOUT A DIVORCE"

In the area of separate maintenance, or legal separation, the
most significant revision suggested in all pending legislation is the
automatic conversion of the decree of separate maintenance to one
for divorce. Traditionally, separate maintenance was designed to
satisfy the spouse who, usually because of religious convictions,
abhorred divorce. If separate maintenance were granted, the spouse
who did not share such convictions was left in limbo. Further, the
device of separate maintenance was a most effective tool of blackmail.
Legislation pending in Illinois suggests this is the time to correct
this injustice. The proposals differ only in the length of time preceding the conversion of a decree of separate maintenance to one of
divorce. 5 ' Conversion occurs on motion of either party and there
is no defense. Thus, the spouse opposed to divorce can justifiably
say to himself that he has done all within his power to prevent divorce. Moreover, the other spouse cannot be held in bondage forever.
Only one act pending in Illinois places a condition precedent to
the granting of separate maintenance and in so doing strictly limits
the use of this action. House Bill 1794 requires both spouses to
agree to separate maintenance prior to the granting of such a decree,
for if one party objects, the court cannot so decree."
"IF I CRY, WILL THE JUDGE GIVE
ME MORE MONEY?"

Under present law dollars and cents issues are interwoven with issues relating to status of the marriage. The result is blackmail,
particularly where considerable assets are at stake. The argument of
50.

Id.

51. H.B. 1794, § 314(b) (6 months); H.B. 477, § 512(b) (2 years); H.B. 403,
§ 6(k) (2 years after decree of separate maintenance based on no-fault separation).
52. H.B. 1794 § 302(b) (In this Act "separate maintenance" is referred to as
"legal separation.")
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the spouse seeking property, alimony, or both, directed against the
other spouse often runs as follows: "You have no grounds for divorce, and I won't give you a divorce unless you pay me what I
want." Illinois property law states that
if . . . either party holds the title to property equitably belonging to the
other, the court may compel conveyance thereof . . .to the party entitled
to the same, upon such terms as it shall deem equitable. 53

This concept of special equities has, under case law, developed a
definite meaning; that is, where title to property is held by one

spouse in his or her name alone, the other spouse must prove a financial contribution to the acquisition of that property in order to claim
any portion thereof. 54 Of course, where title to property is held
jointly in the names of both spouses, each is deemed to own one-

half.55
53. ILL. REV. STATS. ch. 40, § 18 (1971) (emphasis added).
54. Overton v. Overton, 6 Ill. App. 3d 1086, 287 N.E.2d 47 (1973). There the
court upheld the trial court's concept of equally dividing the property of the parties,
title to which the husband had transferred to a land trust to insulate himself from
possible liability arising from a business transaction. The plaintiff wife had
pleaded special circumstances and equities in the property-a 20 year marriage, her
husband's substantial net worth of approximately $160,000.00, her contribution of
$1,000.00 in savings, her several months outside employment during the course of
the marriage, and assistance to her husband in answering the business phone and
making business entries. Although the court denied the trial court's award of
alimony to the wife under section 19 of the Divorce Act (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40,
§ 19 (1971)), it equitably divided the property and held that:
More is required to justify compelling a conveyance of property under
Sec. 17 of the Divorce Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 40, par. 18.). Special
circumstances and equities must be alleged and proven, such as the contribution of money or services other than those normally performed in the
marriage relationship which has directly or indirectly been used to acquire
or enhance the value of the property. The rights and interest a wife
has in the property of her husband by virtue of the marriage relation
alone will not support a conveyance of property under Sec. 17 of the
Divorce Act. Everett v. Everett, 25 Ill. 2d 342, 185 N.E.2d 201 (1962).
Id. at 1089, 287 N.E.2d at 50.
55. One of the most recent cases reiterating this concept is LaRocco v. LaRocco,
10 Ill. App. 3d 366, 293 N.E.2d 756 (1973). In this case the appellate court reversed
and remanded the trial court's award of that portion of a divorce decree directing
the wife to quit-claim her interest in the marital home jointly owned by the parties to her husband after finding that there was nothing in the evidence to prove that
a gift was not intended when the joint tenancy was created. It was undisputed
that both parties had physically worked together to finish the property only partially
completed when purchased entirely with husband's funds. The court held that
[i]n Baker v. Baker, 412 Ill. 511, at 514-515, 107 N.E.2d 711 at 713,
our Supreme Court said:
"* * * Property voluntarily conveyed by a husband to his wife, without
fraud or coercion is presumed to be a gift notwithstanding the fact the
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Attempts to broaden the special equities concept have been relatively unsuccessful. At best a marital home may be given to the
custodial parent where alternative shelter would be the street. The
special equities concept is by no means eroded, nor do the courts as
a practical matter in most cases divide the property equally, as some
contend. The most recent case on the subject as of this writing,
Katz v. Katz,5 6 should dispel any thought to the contrary. In Katz,
a decree was entered granting plaintiff a divorce, giving defendant
control and management of all realty and control of his currency
exchange business (which powers he had prior to the divorce); all
property held in joint tenancy was to be divided and held by the parties as tenants in common; and the parties were to equally divide
certain United States Savings H bonds in the possession of the defendant. Defendant appealed only from that portion of the decree
relating to the division of the savings bonds. On trial plaintiff alleged
that throughout the marriage she had assisted defendant in acquiring personal and real property, some of which was in defendant's
name alone, and some in both their names, and that she was entitled
to an interest in all of the property. Further, she had contributed
$2,000 toward the defendant's business at the outset of their marriage some thirty years prior to the divorce, but she had not contributed to the assets of the parties owned by them at the time of the
trial, and no testimony was presented by plaintiff relative to ownership of the bonds in question.
The appellate court reversed the trial court's equal division of
57
the savings bonds, and interpreted section 18 of the Divorce Act
stating:
Special equities in that property, however, must be pleaded and proven by
the party claiming them....
In the recent case of Debrey v. Debrey, Ill. App., 270 N.E.2d 43, [sic]

husband purchased the property with his own money, and the wife may
hold the property against him. [Cases omitted.] This presumption of
fact is not conclusive but may be rebutted by proof. It can only be
overcome by clear, convincing and unmistakable evidence that no gift was

intended."
See also Peck v. Peck, 16 Ill. 2d 268, 157 N.E.2d 249; Rodely v. Rodely,
28 Ill. 2d 347, 192 N.E.2d 347; and Kratzer v. Kratzer, 130 Ill.
App. 2d
762, 266 N.E.2d 419.

Id. at 368, 293 N.E.2d at 758.
56. 10 Ill. App. 3rd 39, 293 N.E.2d 904 (1973).
57. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40, § 18 (1973).
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the plaintiff alleged no special equities in stock held in her husband's

name, but the trial court nevertheless ordered the husband to transfer
the title to plaintiff.

In reversing that part of the decree, the court on

review stated at page 44:
"We do not deem it even debatable but that in order to invoke the
provisions of § 17 for a conveyance of property, it is necessary for the
plaintiff to allege and prove by evidence or admissions special circumstances or equities warranting such a result."5 8

Consequently, to effect a satisfactory result with regard to property, litigants generally resort to leverage-contesting the divorce,
seeking separate maintenance to "lock in" the other spouse, and, in
short, wearing down the spouse anxious for divorce but incapable of
winning one under present law. This sorry spouse ends up paying
for his freedom and is usually thoroughly relieved when he receives
it, but angry, in fact outraged, at his lawyer and the laws. Keep in
mind that child support is not an issue here. The issues are support
of an ex-spouse and division of property between the partiespartners in this unhappy partnership. To correct present injustice, a
revised law must separate the issue of the status of the marriage from
issues of property and alimony. Such separation is consistent with
the goal of equitably dissolving an unhealthy partnership.
If confusion of facts relevant to status, property, and alimony is
the problem, then obviously a no-fault statute cures the evil. Beware! Every state statute on divorce contains provisions on
grounds which are separate from those on property and support.
There are discernable patterns in these provisions in the statutes
of all states-fault and no-fault alike. These patterns include:
1.

2.

Alimony or support, where provided at all, awarded to either party or

to the wife alone;
Alimony, where provided at all, awarded out of either party's separate
estate or the husband's estate, either in addition to property division
or in lieu of same;

3.

Division of property determined by title, judicial discretion, or factors
such as need;

4.

Separate property of each spouse restored to that spouse free of marital

obligation or subject to division; either party's separate estate, or the hus-

band's estate alone, subject to orders for support but not to orders of
property division.

A change to no-fault grounds is not always accompanied by a
corresponding change in property and support provisions. No-fault
58.

10 Ill.
App. 3rd at 40, 293 N.E.2d at 905 (1973)

(emphasis by the court).
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as applied to the status of the marriage may obliterate the blackmail by removing the leverage ordinarily held by the spouse who is reluctant to divorce and could, under a traditional fault statute, impede, if not prevent, the divorce entirely. A no-fault statute may,
on the other hand, simply shift fault to the property and support
area. The entire statute must be reviewed with careful attention
given property and support provisions. Fault, or marital misconduct, has no place in determining division of property. Those who
accept a punishment-reward premise for divorce laws, of course,
contend differently.
Analyzing the statutes of no-fault divorce states incorporating the
language of "irreconcilable differences" or "irretrievable breakdown,"5 9 one finds that the differences among such statutes in their
support and property provisions are their specificity. How predictable is the outcome of any property dispute or the amount of any alimony award prior to the parties going to court? The outcome in
community property states60 is very predictable with respect to
property-usually an equal division. Discretion is exercised with
respect to support. At the other end of the spectrum are states
which allow total discretion in property division and alimony
awards. Where there is total discretion there is very little predictability. 1 In the middle are statutes which separate the individual
property of one spouse and place all other property, regardless of
title, into a "marital pot" to be distributed according to guidelines
propounded in the statute. Similarly, guidelines govern support.
How predictable is this type of law? Predictable enough. Discretion within fairly specific limits ensures the fairest, most equitable result in each case.
All pertinent legislation pending in Illinois with the exception of
House Bill 403 divides property and awards alimony without regard to title or marital misconduct in accordance with certain guidelines and thus falls within the middle ground heretofore described.
With respect to property, House Bills 477 and 1794 differ slightly
59.

See note 31, supra.

60. Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and
Washington.
61. See Zuckman & Fox, The Ferment in Divorce Legislation, 12 JOURNAL OF
FAMmY LAW 515, 567 & nn. 199-203 (1973) (analyzing statutes of Michigan, Oregon, Iowa, Florida and Nebraska).
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in distinguishing individual from marital property and then dividing
marital property according to guidelines. House Bill 1794 establishes a rebuttable presumption with respect to marital property. 2
The guidelines are designed to set the outside perimeters on judicial discretion and to afford some certainty of outcome in order to
promote negotiation and settlement of disputes. Further, by setting
forth the nature of evidence necessary to prove an ultimate right
to a portion of the marital property, the law properly compels the
lawyer to assume his role as an advocate. House Bill 403 takes a
unique approach to property division"3 and must be quoted verba-

tim without further comment.64
62. House Bill 1794, § 307(c) establishes a rebuttable presumption with respect to marital property in the following language:
All property acquired by either spouse after the marriage and before a
decree of legal separation is presumed to be marital property, regardless
of whether title is held individually or by the spouses in some form of
co-ownership such as joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by the
entirety, and community property. The presumption of marital property
is overcome by a showing that the property was acquired by a method
listed in paragraph (b) [marital property].
H.B. 1794 § 307(a) contains guidelines as follows:
(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition and improvement of the marital property, including the contribution of either spouse
as a homemaker;
(2) Value of the property set apart to each spouse;
(3) Duration of the marriage, and
(4) Economic circumstances of each spouse when the division of property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family
home or the right to live therein for reasonable periods to the spouse having
custody of any children.
House Bill 477, § 607(b) states the following guidelines:
(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition and improvement of the marital property, including the contribution of either spouse as
a homemaker.
(2) The contribution of each spouse to the improvement or enhancement in value of the separate property of the other.
(3) The nature and value of the property.
(4) The duration of the marriage.
(5) The financial needs and capabilities of the parties.
63. The authors are unaware of any divorce statute in force which deals with a
defeasible gift concept.
64. House Bill 403, 2 § 7(a)(b):
Section 27. Adjustment of Property Rights-Defeasible Gifts:
(a) Presumption of defeasible gift.
If an interest is acquired either in contemplation of marriage or after
marriage, by one spouse in property-real or personal-owned by or acquired by the other spouse and it is proven that the spouse granting such
interest owned the property prior to the marriage, or purchased the
property with funds acquired independent of the marital relation, or received the property by gift, devise, bequest or inheritance from a person or
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A major concern among Illinois lawyers with regard to property reform in divorce is whether tendered proposals in effect make
Illinois a community property state. The answer is no. To the extent separate and marital property are distinguished, the approach is
the same as in a community property state. Thereafter, the similar-

ity ends. None of the proposed Illinois bills adopt the usual equal
division of community property states.
In no-fault states, statutes governing alimony, like those concerning property division, vary as to specifics. All proposed Illinois legislation awards alimony in accordance with certain guidelines, re-

gardless of marital fault. Within these guidelines judicial discretion
can be exercised. Alimony can be awarded to either spouse under
House Bills 477 and 1794. House Bill 1794, however, initially re-

quires proof that the spouse seeking alimony is incapable of selfsupport. After such proof, the guidelines control.6 5
House Bill 477 allows fault in the nature of traditional fault
grounds to be raised as an affirmative defense to bar or mitigate alimony against a spouse not entitled to the same, for example,

the 20-year old blond darling, who, after two years of marriage
and repeated nefarious contacts with her high school sweetheart, de-

cides she made the wrong choice of a mate when she married the espersons other than his or her present spouse, and that the spouse granted
such interest advanced no consideration for the acquisition of such interest,
it shall be presumed that such interest was acquired as a gift in consideration of the continuation of the marital relation and known as a defeasible
gift.
(b) Effect of cessation of marital relation on defeasible gift.
If a spouse who has granted a defeasible gift proves that the marital relationship has ceased because of the action of the spouse who was granted
the gift, the court may make such orders or render such judgment, including a reconveyance, in whole or in part, of such interest to the original
grantor, respecting the property as equity and justice require.
In determining its action, the court shall take into consideration the
circumstances under which such interest was granted, the length of time
such interest has been held by the grantor, the extent to which either or
both of the parties have contributed to the maintenance and appreciation
in value of the property, the effect of divestiture upon minor children, the
extent to which the acquiring spouse helped to create an atmosphere which
made acquisition of the entire property possible, the comparative fault of
the parties in causing a marital breakdown, and any other factors which
will permit the court to arrive at a just decision, bearing in mind that no
person should be unjustly enriched.
This defeasible gift concept is the only treatment of property division in House
Bill 403.
65. H.B. 1794, § 308(b).
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tablished, hard-working business tycoon whose only diversion in
his 60-year life span was to embellish his life with his 20-year old
wife. This allowance of an affirmative defense to alimony is a necessary protection against an unjust windfall to a spouse who clearly
caused the marriage breakdown. It is the only legitimate place to
allow proof of fault because the unpleasantness of such proof is outweighed by the injustice of an otherwise arbitrary alimony award.
Where misconduct of the spouse seeking alimony has clearly undermined the marriage, such spouse ought not to expect and receive
what amounts to monetary reward for such conduct.
Two other bills pending in Illinois affect alimony. House Bill
1262, now enacted into law, allows one who in good faith married a
bigamist the same rights to alimony as in other cases.6 6 House
Bill 459 defines remarriage for purposes of alimony. 67
In addition to removing fault as a consideration, the most obvious change in support statutes is the limitation on alimony both in
time and amount. Query, whether this results from the changing
role of women or the concept of no-fault? Ideally, support laws
should treat males and females equally, but until job opportunities,
salaries, and promotions for women are the same as for men, the
law must retain sufficient flexibility and judicial discretion to alleviate economic inequities where they exist. There is variety among
no-fault statutes in the areas of property and support. Illinois proposals containing guidelines on judicial discretion are in line with the
majority trend.
"WHAT DO YOU MEAN-HE HAS A RIGHT
TO SEE THE CHILD?"

No law can contain too many protections for children of broken
marriages. The rule of thumb used in our present law as an appropriate standard in determining questions of custody, visitation and
child support is the best interest of the child. All of the legislation
pending in Illinois retains this generalized standard while enumerating specific guidelines for these determinations. The presumption
that the interests of very young children are better protected by
66.

H.B. 1262, amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 20 (1971)

(effective Octo-

ber 1, 1973).
67. House Bill 459, § 18 reads as follows: "Remarriage includes cohabiting
with another person of the opposite sex with or without a marriage license and even
if said marriage is later annuled [sic]."
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placement with their mothers is certainly subject to question under
the language of proposed legislation. In addition to listing certain
facts to be considered in determining custody,68 House Bill 477
specifically provides that conduct of the custodian or proposed custodian which does not affect the child is irrelevant. 69 This bill
further provides that either or both parents shall pay child support
and sets forth relevant guidelines governing the amount to be paid by
each.7" House Bill 1794 and the Revised Uniform Act are identical in
these respects.
Recognizing that a child need not be deprived of the attention
and companionship of a grandparent, an aunt, or other persons interested in him, House Bills 477 and 403 allow visitation rights to
such interested persons as well as to the parents. 71 This recognition does much to correct wrongs vested upon children by parents
who, when left to their own whims, go to extremes to effect such deprivation.
House Bills 477 and 403 parallel each other in providing for the
support of non-minor children when they are either mentally or
physically disabled, or are students at an educational institution.72
Further, guardians ad litem are given increased responsibilities. A
child's interests may be adverse to those of his parents, and it is of
68.

House Bill 477, § 704(a)(1)-(5) reads:
Where there is at issue the custody of a minor or dependent child the

court may, during the pendency of a proceeding or at any time thereafter,
make such order for the custody of such child during his minority or dependency as may be necessary and proper.

(a) Issues for determination.
The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interests
and welfare of the child, and shall consider all relevant factors including:

(1) The wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody.
(2) The wishes of the child as to his custodian.
(3) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent
or parents, his siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interests.

(4) The child's adjustment to his home, school, and community.
(5) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.

69.

H.B. 477, § 704(b).

70. H.B. 477, § 604(a)(l)-(4). The relevant guidelines are: (1) the financial
resources of both parents; (2) the standard of living the child would have enjoyed
had the marriage not been dissolved; (3) the age, physical and emotional condition
of the child and his educational needs; and (4) the financial resources of the child.

71.
72.

H.B. 477, § 705; H.B. 403, § 20.1(a).
H.B. 477, § 604(b); H.B. 403, § 20.1(e).

352

DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:326

paramount importance that, if this is the case, the court be advised
and the child's interests be represented and protected.73
Hopefully, the deletion of fault from questions affecting children,
together with additional guidelines for support, custody and visitation, will prevent the all too frequent practice of parents either consciously or subconsciously using children to achieve their own objectives.
UNIFORMITY FOR ILLINOIS?

Progressive, realistic reform in Illinois family law should be our
immediate concern, not legislating for the several states to create uniformity. 74 The proposed Uniform Act and Revised Uniform Act emphasize and guide necessary, enlightened legislation in every state.
It is a disservice to make laws governing marriage and divorce the same in every state without regard to the nature and traditions of the people within a given state. Preventing forum shopping is insufficient justification for sacrificing individuality in statutes governing family relationships, because values, living patterns, and
human relationships vary from state to state-even among districts or portions within a state.
CONCLUSION

There is no such thing as a perfect law. In family law we need
legislation which is progressive but realistic, idealistic yet workable,
and futuristic yet acceptable. The law should be sufficiently specific
to afford predictability while permitting discretion to effect fairness in each and every case; and while legislating for the majority,
we must consider the minority.
In the area of family law, which necessarily involves basic human
emotions and hence is highly volatile, a statute must be a compromise. The compromise, however, must be one which preserves
an individual's right to be a private person living his life as he
sees fit within certain broad outlines acceptable to society.
73.
74.

H.B. 1794, § 310; H.B. 477, §§ 703(a), (b); H.B. 403, § 20.6.
House Bill 1794, § 103 states its purpose as:

Section 103.

Uniformity of Application and Construction.

This Act

shall be so applied and constructed as to effectuate its general purpose to

make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this Act among
those states which enact it.

